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FELIX COHENO
THAT all valuations of law are moral judgments, that the major
part of legal philosophy is a branch of ethics, that the problem
which the judge faces is, in the strictest sense, a moral problem,
and that the law has no valid end or purpose other than the main-
tenance of the good life are propositions which jurists are apt to
resent with some acerbity. In the orthodox juristic tradition
there is some sort of boundary between the realm of law and the
realm of morality or ethics; legal philosophy deals with justice
rather than with goodness; morality is at most an emergency
consideration in the problem before a judge, and his decision of
that problem will be right or wrong in some non-ethical sense;
finally it is not the business of the law to make men good pro-
vided only it makes them act justly. It is submitted that these
tenets of current juristic faith spring from an indefensible view
of the nature and scope of ethics and tinge current legal criticism
with a peculiar confusion.
Before examining the relation of law to ethics, it may be well
to point out that those who deny the ethical responsibilities of
law and legal science do not refrain from passing what we should
ordinarily call ethical judgments upon the law. A historical
school of law vehemently disclaims concern with ethics or natural
law,' but repeatedly invokes a Volksgeist or a Zcitgeist to decide
what the law ought to be.2 An analytical school of jurisprudence
: Book Review and Current Legislation Editor of Columbia Law Revxiw
for 1930-1931; contributor to Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences; now
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and the New School of Social Research.
This article forms an introductory chapter in a study of "Ethical Systems
and Legal Ideals" to be published by the Vanguard Press.
'See INE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (7th ed. 1914) '070 and
lectures 12 and 13 passim; Savigny, Uebcr do& Zwccl dikscr Zcitcchrift
(1815) 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FU"R GESCHICHT. RECHTSWISSENScMT 4-5.
2 See CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COo0N LAW (1834)
86 et seq. (a paper prepared at the request of the committee of the Bar Aszo-
ciation of the City of New York, appointed to oppose the measure). This
pamphlet is largely based upon Savigny's essay, Voai BEnUF uNsrnR ZmT
FU-R GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSwISSENSCHAFT (1814), translated by Hay-
ward as THE VOCATION OF OR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND Jur spnuDENCE
(1831), which was written under somewhat similar circumstances in an-
swer to the demand for codification of German law (See THm,,rT, UEBER,
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again dismisses questions of morality,3 and again decides what
the law ought to be by reference to a so-called logical ideal.'
Those who derive the law from the will of the sovereign usually
introduce without further justification the implication that it is
good to obey that will.5 And those who define law in terms of
prevailing social demands or interests frequently make use of an
undisclosed principle to the effect that these demands ought to
be satisfied.
The objection, then, is not that jurists have renounced ethical
judgment, but that they have renounced ethical science. Ethical
science involves an analysis of ethical judgments, a clarification
of ethical premises. Among the current legal crypto-idealisms
there can be no edifying controversy since there is no recognition
of the moral issues to which their differences reduce. One looks
in vain in legal treatises and law review articles for legal criti-
cism conscious of its moral presuppositions. The vocabularies of
logic and aesthetics are freely drawn upon in the attempt to
avoid the disagreeable assertion that something or other is in-
trinsically better than something else. Particular decisions or
legal rules are "anomalous" or "illogical", "incorrect" or "im-
practical", "reactionary" or "liberal", and unarguable ethical
innuendo takes the place of critical analysis.7 Little wonder then
DIE NOTHWENDIGKEIT EINES ALLGEMEINEN BbRGERLICHEN ECHTS 0R1
DEUTSCHLAND, reprinted in THIBAUT, CIVILISTISCHE ABHANDLUNGEN (1814)
404).
It was characteristic that Maine's famous generalization "status to con-
tract" (MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861) c. 5) was proposed and generally re-
ceived as an indication of the desirability of free contract.
3 See Amos, SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE (1872) 18; POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS (1882) c. 1 (The Nature of Jurisprudcnco)
18-32.
4 A good example of this ethical use of analysis is found in the develop-
ment of the prima facie theory of torts (see POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS (1st
ed. 1887) c. 1) which purports to be merely an analysis of what has always
been the law but actually gives the old law of conspiracy a new impetus
(see Note (1930) 30 CoL. L. REV. 510) and threatens to extend its vagaries
over the individual life.
"Legislatures and courts formulate or seek to formulate the will of all
of us as to the conduct of each of us in our relations with each other and
with all. That will ought to be wholly effective. That it fails of effect in
any degree is a misfortune." Pound, Enforcement of Law (1908) 20 GREEN
BAG 401.
(;See Pound, Jurisprudence, in HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (1925) 472, and Pound, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANY
(1922) 95-99.
7 One might expect to find in the American Law Institute's attempted
"Restatements" of various branches of the common law some attempt to
work out the meaning of controversial rules of law in terms of social con-
sequences and some indication of the moral standards which make the rule
laid down in Mississippi preferable to the rule laid down in Ohio. Instead,
one meets the pious fiction, implicit in the very title of the enterprise, that
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that on a more abstract plane of thought the classification of
ideas has taken the place of legal philosophy,8 while Hegelian
pictures of inevitable trends are offered as substitutes for the
delineation of the desirableY
It is probable that the dependence of jurisprudence upon ethics
is partly obscured by the habit of smuggling etfical notions into
one's definition of law. Blackstone could define law as "a rule of
civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, com-
manding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong."' I This
is very much like the benevolent definition of a sou as a small
coin to be given to the poor. Upon such a definition the question
of whether law is good cannot be significant, and ethical questions
the common law is a system within which intellectual inspection reveals a
definite answer for every legal question. Decisions are hailed as "correct"
or "incorrect" rather than "good" or "bad", and truth is obtained either
in accordance with the mathematical precepts of the Valentinian Law of
Citations (426 A. D.), or by projecting evolutionary "tendencies" found
in the past decisions of courts, or by reacting aesthetically to the harmony
or discord between a questioned rule and the rest of the legal "system."
Cf. the strictures of Kantorowicz upon the German civil code, REcHrswIs-
SENSCHAFT UNID SoZIOLOGIm (1911) 8.
SAll who appreciate Dean Pound's unparalleled equipment in legal
philosophy must hope that such taxonomic studies as L,,w AND 'MORALS
(1924); The Scope and P2!rpose of Sociological Jirispudnce (1911) 24
HARV. L. REv. 591, (1911-12) 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 4S9; The E-d of Law
as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines (1914) 27 HAnV. L. REV. 195;
The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought (1914) 27 HAir. L.
REv. 605, (1917Y 30 HAnv. L. REV. 201 are preludes to some affirmative
statement of valid legal standards or ideals.
9 Courts frequently rely or purport to rely not on actual decisions but on
tendencies in series of past decisions. The fact that two earlier cases have
each stretched a rule a little further than existing precedents in each ease
warranted is taken to indicate the desirability of stretching the rule still
further in a third case. The assumption seems to be that all change is
for the better and is infinitely capable of extension. The philosophical
generalization of this type of argument is, of course, evolutionism. Dean
Pound has frequently followed Hegel, Marx, and Spencer in putting for-
ward evolutionary schemes of legal history in answer to strictly ethical
questions. See INTRODUCTION TO THE PH,osorHY 0p IAW (1922) 95-99;
Justice According to Law (1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 690, (1914) 14 CoL. L.
Rm. 1, 103, especially at 117-21; The Theory of Juedicial Decision (192"0)
36 HARV. L. Rnv. 641, 802, 940, especially at 954-8. But this identification
of the inevitable and the desirable under the banner of Progress is, as Hux-
ley, Sidgwick, G. E. Moore, and 3i. R. Cohen have demonstrated, intel-
lectually indefensible,--however gratifying emotionally it may be to feel
that cheering for the winning side is the substance of morality.
10 BLAGc soNE, CO I~mENTAnmS 44. That "right" and "wrong" in this
definition are ethical rather than strictly legal terms is made clear In
Blackstone's own exegesis upon his definition. "5 4-5 5. Much confusion
in the reading and, it may be suspected, in the writing of continental legal
philosophy arises from the fact that Rccht, droit, diritto, etc. denote at the
same time the positive concept of law and the normative notion of right,
justice or ideal law.
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are either evaded by denying the appellation law to certain en-
actments and courses of judicial decision or else settled by the
complacent and preposterous assumption that whatever sover-
eigns have commanded is good. Law is law, whether it be good
or bad, and only upon the admission of this truism can a mean-
ingful discussion of the goodness and badness of law rest. '
Upon any of the current positive definitions of law, r g., "the
body of rules according to which courts decide controversies","1
the indispensability of ethics in legal criticism is immediately
obvious.12 Ethics involves all final applications of the terms good,
11 This definition (see Keyser, On the Study of Legal Science (1929)
38 YALE L. J. 413) seems to me to avoid an unfortunate ambiguity in
Gray's definition of law as "composed of the rules which the courts . . .
lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties." GRAY, NATURE
AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909) § 191. I do not think that Gray meant to
equate law with rules enunciated by courts, but if he did Mr. Frank's
criticism that such rules are often merely verbal and in any case subject
to interpretation, with the result that they must be considered sources of
law (like statutes) rather than.law, is irrefutable. See FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND (1930) 121-32. In any case, Gray failed to recognize
with sufficient clarity that judges make law only in the way that electrons
make physics and amoebae make biology. What is law, as that ter'm is
most commonly used by lawyers, is the way or pattern in which judges
decide cases, and this way or pattern may be as remote from the mind of
the judge as is the Gestalt psychology from Kbhler's anthropoid subjects.
As a matter of fact a lawyer looking for "the law" on a point will generally
pay more attention to a wholly unofficial schemati7ation of decided cases
found in a legal treatise than to a judicial opinion which "lays down" the
law. Where this is not the case, it is because of the scholarship of the
particular judge rather than his authority.
12 In a recent article Professor Dickinson has attacked the realistic or
positive definition of law on the ground that it does not fit the problem of
the judge himself, who does not want to know what he is about to do,
(Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision (1931) 79 U. OF P.
L. REV. 833, 843-844). But this is to assume that a judge's duty is to find
the law rather than to mold it, an assumption which no realist makes. In
a similar vein Dickinson argues that if we should call judicial responsive-
ness to unworthy motives law, it would become "difficult . . to find any
proper standard for criticizing the behavior of the judge." (ibid. 838) Again
by assuming without question the traditional premises which realists have
been attacking, Dickinson arrives at an absurdity which he ascribes to his
opponents. Unless one assumes that law is above ethical criticism, there
is no difficulty in criticizing a judge for making or perpetuating bad law.
The confusion becomes evident when Dickinson asserts that "a legal rule,
even though derived by generalization from what has been done, is not a
rule of isness because it either may or may not be applied in the next case,
i. e., the case for which the rule is sought, depending on the volition of the
judge." (ibid. 860, note 51) Obviously if a legal rule is a general formula-
tion of judicial behavior, it must explain the next case as well as the last
case. The existence of legal rules is not disturbed by judicial volition, since
rules are simply descriptions of the way judicial volition works. And a de-
scription of judicial volition is a rule of isness. Dickinson has confused
normative and descriptive science by failing to recognize that a description
[Vol. 41
LEGAL CRITICISM
bad, better, best, right, ought, and their derivatires.1l We may
decide whether law is good for strengthening social bonds or bad
for the peace of mind of criminals, without any appeal to ethics,
but when we come to the question of whether the strengthening
of social bonds or the peace of mind of criminals is good, and
whether law which has the described effects is good, we are in the
realm of ethics. Thus every valuation of law, every folmulation
of the ideal object or end of law, must be either categorical and
ethical, or conditional, in terms of some ulterior aim which can
itself be valued ethically. In either case, there is no way of
escaping the final responsibility of law to ethics, and, since the
legal order is a complex of human activities, to morality.
Although the criticism of elements of the legal order is ethical,
it does not exhaust the realm of ethics, for ethical judgments can
certainly be passed upon other things than law, and even upon
tfings which law can in no wise affect. To delimit the realm of
ethics which is relevant to law is merely to outline the body of
ethically justiciable facts which law can comprehend or affect.
And that body of facts, of couise, is something which will vary
with the level of commercial, industrial, and military development
reached in a given society, with the temper of a people and their
political-ethical beliefs, and with all other factors that go to de-
termine the balance of powers and desires upon which law en-
forcement rests. To neglect, for instance, the influence of the
machine gun in strengthening the forces behind law against
rebellious populations and thus making it possible for the state
to legislate in fields once closed to it is simply to make legal ideals
of ancient facts. There is no realm of human conduct that we
can hold eternally absolved from the possibility of judicial con-
of purposive behavior is not itself purposive. He has said nothing which
reveals the impossibility or undesirability of a descriptive science of judi-
cial conduct. He has offered no reason for believing that law as the realists
understand the term is not a more precise concept (his own criterion of
definition) than the amorphous Something which is neither a description
of what courts actually do nor a formulation of what they ought to do
(ibid. 861-862) but a jumble of the two notions whose only merit is faith-
fulness to the fundamental confusions in modern juristic thought.
131 follow G. E. Moore in this use of the word ethics to cover all prob-
lems of goodness and its related concepts, whether or not concerned with
human conduct, leaving the term morallty to designate the narrower field
of value judgments of voluntary human acts. This use of the term cthics is,
I think, too well substantiated historically to require apology. "Axiology"
or "theory of values" may be more accurate appellations for our subject
from a philological point of view, since they avoid the suggestion of a
particular reference to human conduct. But both names are much too
clumsy for consistent usage, and the latter at least carries its own aura
of ambiguity, being extended in application to values other than goodness
(e. g., truth and beauty), while frequently restricted, from the viewpoint
of method, to a particular naturalistic philosophy.
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trol and the need of juristic attention. The only permanent re-
striction that we can fix upon the realm of ethical goods in terms
of which law must be judged is found in the proposition that law
can affect only human activities and such other happenings as
depend upon human activities. 14 The good life 11 is the final and
indispensable standard of legal criticism."'
This proposition is commonly attacked on two grounds. In the
first place, it is claimed, we do not know what the effects of law
will be. And in the second place, we do not know what the good
life is.
Both of these objections are true in a certain sense, but in that
sense they do not contradict our conclusion. It is certainly true
that we cannot calculate all the effects of law or of anything
else. And it is equally obvious that our knowledge of ethics and
of human nature is not great enough to permit us to describe
completely and in detail what constitutes the good life for each
person or even for the abstract man. But if there is any such
thing as human knowledge, we certainly have a fair degree of it
upon both these subjects. And, as a great French jurist, M. Pierre
Tourtoulon, has said, "There is no need to throw to the dogs
everything that is not fit for the altars of the gods." A recog-
nition of the inadequacy of our knowledge in these fields can
bring a sweet scepticism into our political beliefs, but it cannot
deny them. To quote again from Tourtoulon, "The greatest jurist
has only very vague ideas concerning the services that the laws
which he expounds and explains render to society. . . The first
step toward wisdom is the knowledge that we are ignorant of
nearly all the functions of our laws, or of the evil or the good
which they may bring us." 17
The inadequacy of human knowledge, we may conclude, does
not destroy the usefulness of our form of evaluation. In fact, a
judgment of ethical values whose truth is recognized to be par-
tially dependent upon the accuracy of human scientific knowledge
seems to be far more useful than the sort of judgment which as-
sumes that however uncertain the physical results of an act may
14 Possible intrinsic goods in the legal order, c. g., the happiness of judges
and the aesthetic satisfactions of lawyers, are themselves elements in live,
affected by law. Non-human goods achievable by law, a. g., the well-being
of domestic animals, may be accounted for in the instrumental valuation
of the human lives through which they are attained.
15 In speaking of the good life I do not, of course, mean to imply that
different sorts of living may not be equally valuable. The good lifo is
simply a concept common, though applying in varying degrees, to all lives
worth living.
-6 See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Bk. 7, c. 1; NICHOMIACHArN ETHICS, Bk. 1,
c. 2; RUSSELL, POLITICAL IDEALS (1917) 4.
7 TOURTOULON, LES PRINCIPES PHILOSOPHIQUES DE L'HISTOI1RE Dt) DROIT
(1908) translated in 13 MODERN LEGAL PHIIOSOPHY SERIES (1922) 24,
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be, we can know clearly in advance whether they will be good or
bad.
Suppose, however, that this is erroneous, and that our actual
judgments of law in terms of the good life are wholly unreliable
and useless. Still it does not follow that the theory which makes
legal values dependent upon such causal efficacy is false. Great
confusion has been caused in ethical controversy by the belief
that knowing and publishing the truth is always good, and that
it is therefore unnecessary to distinguish between the goodness
or usefulness of an ethical theory and its truth. ' The judgment
that the value of law depends upon the law's efficacy in promoting
the good life would be true even if it were wholly useless in legal
criticism. But I believe that this judgment is far from useless,
for although it offers no material measure of legal values, it pro-
vides a logical base upon which all significant discussion of the
subject can rest.19 In this field of the valuation of law, as in most
other domains of thought, confusion is a more potent source of
evil than is error. A formal principle of this sort cannot insure
against error, but it can bring light to the foundations of our
thinking. It can bring our traditional legal controversies into the
fertilizing context of ethical science. It can free legal criticism
from blind deduction from obsolete moral postulates. It can
illumine "social engineering" by inducing a critical attitude
towards the social interests that the law is asked to protect.20 It
'S An interesting example of the attempt to prove propositions by show-
ing the disastrous effects of disbelief is provided in a recent volume by
'Professor Brumbaugh which bears the promising title LEGAL REASONING
AND BRIMFnG: "Thus all things made legal are at the same time made
legally ethical because it is law, and the law must be deemed ethical, or
the system itself must perish." (p. 7).
19 The responsibility of law and juristic science to pure ethics, which is
analysed in this article, does not exhaust the significance of this principle.
The relevance of sociological data to law, which is the converse aspect of
this formula (What are the effects of law upon human life?), is developed
in Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudcncc, sgtpra
note 8, especially at 512.
20 The current notion that the function of the jurist is simply to secure
adequate enforcement for the expressed demands of society (see L. K.
Frank, Intitutionma Analysis of the Law (1924) 24 CoL. L. RE%,. 480,
497-8 for an interesting reductio ad absurdian of this view) derives from a
dangerous metaphor. Society is not vocal. The expressed demands of
society are the demands of vocally organized groups, and a discrect dc-
ference to the power of such groups should not lead us to confuse their
demands with "social welfare." Cf. Judge Hough's criticism of this con-
fusion in his review of Dean Pound's SemIT OF THE CoimaoN LAW (1922),
in (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 385: "The present lecturer can and does sum
up the judicial duty of decision by saying that the jurists of today (and
judges are presumable jurists) are content to seek the jural postulates of
the civilization of the time-a phrase extremely easy of translation into
keeping one's ear to the ground to hear the tramp of insistent crowds."
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can bring legal scholarship into a more intimate contact with
practical legal problems by reminding jurists that logical, histor-
ical, and sociological analyses of law are merely necessary intro-
ductions to the argument: This decision or statute is desirable
because in some way it promotes the good life.
II
That the valuation of law is thus dependent upon our concept of
the good life is perhaps a truism, but it is certainly not a com-
monplace. The ignoring or tacit rejection of this dependence is
extremely general in juristic literature, although few legal writ-
ers have made their disavowal explicit. To M. Leon Duguit we
may profitably appeal for a statement of the typical position
that the field of law is independent of ethics and morality. To
show the inadequacy of this doctrine is to point to the error upon
which a vast amount of legal philosophizing is based.
Law, according to Duguit, has for its sole purpose, social soli-
darity. Solidarity, he insists, is a fact, not a rule of conduct. "It
is not an imperative." 21 Duguit shows inductively that law
makes for social solidarity and that such solidarity is a feature
of all societies. But, as with so many other jurists, this induc-
tive generalization suffers a gradual metamorphosis"- and is
finally used as the sole basis for such commands or ethical judg-
ments as the following: "Respect every act of individual will de-
termined by an end of social solidarity;" 12 "every individual
ought to abstain from any act that would be determined by an
end contrary to social solidarity ; 24 "it is a crime to preach
the struggle of classes." 25 Since it is impossible to derive the
goodness of an act from its frequency or universality, Duguit's
judgments can be true only if the doctrine of solidarity is, in
21 DUGUIT, L'ETAT: Lu DRO1T OBJECTIF ET LA Loi POSITIVE, translated in
7 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES (1916) 259.
22 Professor Husik, in a review of ToURTOULON'S PHILOSOPHY IN TIE
DEVELOPMENT OF LAW in (1923) 71 U. OF P. LAw REV. 416 thus sum.
marizes the procedure: " . . . one starts with the proposition, 'Men live
in society', which is perfectly true, and ends up with the statement, 'The
aim of the life of the individual is to contribute to the development of
the social body', which is far from being a scientific statement and may
easily be denied. Moreover if the last proposition is intended as imposing
an obligation, it can never be logically derived from the statement of a
fact. Most, if not all, of the books dealing with natural law by advocates
of that doctrine, such as Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, Lorimer, are guilty of
this fallacy." (pp. 418, 419).
23 DUGUIT, op. cit. supra. note 21, at 290.
24 Ibid. 292.
25 DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GENERALES DU DROIT PRIVI DEI'UIS LM




contradiction to his own claims, an ethical imperative. It seems
fair to characterize such a position as crypto-idealism. Duguit
has not gotten rid of ethics at all, as he proposes to do, but he
has agreed not to use the word "ethics" lest his extremely shaky
ethical system be challenged.2
Although Duguit's aversion to the concepts of ethics is not
very widely shared outside the realm of jurisprudence, he can
claim the support of many philosophers for the faulty method
by which he actually builds up his ethical system. Bertr and Rus-
sell thus analyzes the method:
"It may be laid down that'every ethical system is based upon a
certain non sequitur. The philosopher first invents a false theory
as to the nature of things, and then deduces that wicked actions
are those which show that his theory is false. To begin with the
traditional Christian: he argues that, since everything always
obeys the will of God, wickedness consists in disobedience to the
will of God. We then come on to the Hegelian, who argues that
the universe consists of parts which harmonize in a perfect or-
ganism, and therefore wickedness consists of behavior which de-
minishes the harmony-though it is difficult to see how such be-
havior is possible, since complete harmony is metaphysically
necessary. Bergson ... shows that human beings never behave
mechanically, and then, in his book on Lauglztcr, he argues that
what makes us laugh is to see a person behaving mechanically-
i. e., you are ridiculous when you do something that shows Berg-
son's philosophy to be false, and only then. These examples have,
I hope, made it plain that a metaphysic can never have ethical
consequences except in virtue of its falsehood; if it were true,
the acts which it defines as sin would be impossible." 2
The application of this analysis has been modestly under-esti-
mated by Mr. Russell. For all ethical theories which are extracted
from positive thought, scientific as well as metaphysical, show a
similar weakness. Everything obeys the law of evolution. There-
fore those societies that do not obey the law of evolution are in-
ferior. All men act instinctively. Therefore those who repress
their instincts are bad. All commercial transactions take place
in accordance with the laws of supply and demand. Therefore
every interference with the laws of supply and demand is unde-
sfirable. All law springs from the national spirit. Therefore law
which does not spling from this spirit (code law, etc.) is bad.2"
26 M. Duguit naively confesses to having experienced -ome disquietude
with his ultimate appeal to social fact when Germany was destroying Bel-
gium. But the final punishment of Germany apparently convinced him that
social force is its own justification. Duguit, Objective Law (1921) 20
COL. L. REv. 817, (1921) 21 CoL. L. REV. 17, 126, 242, especially 254-56.
27 RUSSELL, SCEPTICAL ESSAYS (1928) c. 7 (Behaviorlwz. and Values) 94.
28 It is only with the aid of this fallacy that the historical, analytical,
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It is unnecessary to multiply, examples.
The abduction of law from the domain of morality is defended
by Professor E. M. Morgan in a slightly different manner. He
writes:
"It must be remembered that the law does not have the same
purpose as religion or ethics or morals. It is not concerned with
developing the spiritual or moral character of the individual but
with regulating his objective conduct toward his fellows. Conse-
quently courts will have to formulate and apply some rules which
have no relation at all to morals, some which have to place
a loss upon one of two equally blameless persons, some which im-
pose liability regardless of fault and some which refuse to pe-
nalize conduct denounced by even the morally blind. It must be
apparent that the moral law has no mandate upon the content of
the rules of the road... "20
This passage is so clearly typical of a view widely maintained
(particularly in our American law schools) that we may profit-
ably subject it to a closer criticism than its position in a student's
handbook might otherwise warrant. In the first sentence we are
told that law does not have the same purpose as religion or eth-
ics or morals. It is upon the ambiguity of this word that the
specious force of the rest of the argument depends. If the word
refers to the state of mind of judges or legislators, the assertion
that this differs from the state of mind of moralists, ethical phi-
losophers, and religious leaders is perhaps true but is completely
irrelevant to Professor Morgan's ethical conclusions as to what
the law ought to do. If by the "purpose" of law is meant that at
which law ought to aim, the statement is relevant, indeed basic,
to his further conclusions, but obviously false. For the law ought
to secure the good life, which is the ideal purpose of moral and
religious rules as well.
In the second sentence of this excerpt we are told that law is
not concerned with certain noble ends. Again the same basic am-
biguity. If the law is not actually concerned with man's spiritual
metaphysical, and sociological schools of jurisprudence are able to wage
civil war. Were the interests of these schools properly confined to the
history, the internal analysis, the metaphysical status, and the sociological
functioning of law, repectively, conflict would be impossible and we should
see, instead, simply a salutary division of labor. But each school haa
smuggled an ethics into its positive studies. To the argument of the his-
toricists that since law is a product of national custom, the Rechtsg9fithl,
or the Volksgeist, it ought to follow these lines, the analytical school replica
that since law is the command of the sovereign or the ruling of the courts,
it ought to obey these latter masters. Jurists of metaphysical and socio-
logical persuasion add to the heat of the fray with equally invalid brands.
of crypto-idealism.
20 MORGAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW (1926) 32-33.
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or moral character, that is an unfortunate fact which we ought
to remedy. But if this assertion means that the law ought not
to be determined with reference to such factors, it is simply
false. Man's 'moral life is fundamentally molded by rules of
property law, family law, etc., and the refusal to follow the mean-
ing of such legal rules into their ultimate moral or spiritual im-
plications is the essence of legalistic obscurantism.
- In the third sentence we are told that consequently courts have
to formulate rules which have no relation at all to morals, and
here the confusion between the is and the ought bears its first
fruits. Thus far Professor Morgan's statements can be justified
if given a non-ethical interpretation, but if such an interpretation
be given, the inference of have to (apparently ethical) from does
and is is clearly fallacious. Here an ethical interpretation of the
preceding sentences is required, and that, we have seen, results
in error.
Thus Professor Morgan's conclusions are, if valid, based upon
false premises, and, if based upon true premises, invalid. Their
truth, as distinguished from the validity of their inference, can
be defended, but only upon the assumption that the word moral-
ity is severed from reference to objective conduct and even to
such problems of "inner belief" as are involved in the distribu-
tion of liabilities apart from fault, etc. Of course, if any one
wishes to use the words morality and ethics in this milk-and-
watery significance, no logical objection can be raised. But when
such a use of terms results in, or springs from, the belief that
judgments of good and evil can legitimately be applied only to
man's secret intentions, we are called upon to point out that
this is an indefensible theory of morality.
A great many other jurists have attempted in one way or an-
other to discover an "end of law" independent of ethics or moral-
ity. Korkunov writes, "Morality furnishes the criterion for the
proper evaluation of our interests; law marks out the limits
within which they ought to be confined." 20 But it is obvious that
the law does not actually do this, and if the reply is made that
at least law ought to do this, then we must turn to morality for
the basis and significance of this ought. Vinogradoff writes,
"Law is clearly distinguishable from morality. The object of
law is the submission of the individual to the will of organized
society, while the tendency of morality is to subject the indi-
vidual to the dictates of his own conscience." 3 Berolzheimer
supplies the following argument, based, it seems, upon the un-
pleasant connotations of the idea of expedienoj: "If all law has
so KoRUNov, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW (1909), translated from the Rus-
sian in 4 MODE T LEGAL PmwsoPHY SERmEs (1909) 52.
3
1VINOGRADOFF, COMMON SENSE IN LAW (1914) 58.
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in view the welfare of society, then law abdicates in favor of
administration; the ideal of political expediency displaces the
idea of right." 32 But it is impossible to exhaust the instances of
this juristic attempt to abduct law from the domain of ethics
and morality. Suffice it to say that the writers who make the
ideal end of law independent of morality never refrain from
passing ethical or moral judgments upon law. They have simply
rejected particular moral theories, such as that of the infalli-
bility of conscience (Vinogradoff), believing, correctly for the
most part, that these doctrines are useless for jurisprudence, and
incorrectly assuming that they are the whole of morality. A
more or less unconscious moral standard is made the basis of
their valuations of law, and while such a morality has frequently
been more correct than the current ethical theory which was re-
jected, the resulting confusions of thought have been atrocious.
III
But there are further objections to our fundamental principle.
Even those who admit, in general, the ultimate responsibility of
law to morality sometimes suggest that there is at least a large
body of law in the criticism of which ethics must be quite irrele-
vant. The boundaries of this non-moral realm may be variously
drawn and may be either of a substantive character or of an
adjectival or functional significance. In either view, such a claim
is fatal to the soundness of our theory, which denies the ultimate
validity of all legal criticism which is not ethical. It is our
task, then, to examine and, if possible, to refute these objections.
There is, in the first place, a comparatively trivial interpreta-
tion which may be given them, in terms of which no incompati-
bility with our basic contentions can arise. By non-moral do-
mains in the law we may mean sets of equally valuable alterna-
tives. In this sense of the term, law, like every other aspect of
human life, may be non-moral, but in these domains there can be'
no appeal from morality to a non-moral principle (precedent,
custom, etc.) to decide which alternative is better than the other.
By the very formulation of our problem we have denied that any
alternative is better than the others. It is only the claim that in
certain domains of law valid problems of what ought to be done
may be solved without any appeal to the concept of the good life
that we are concerned to refute.
Such a claim is presented by the theory that a large part of
civil law, especially commercial law, constitutes a domain in
which some principles other than those of morality must be our




guide. 33 What jurists frequently mean, I suppose, when they
speak of the existence and necessity of non-moral law, is that
there are many questions of conduct which would be morally in-
different if there were no law, but which become morally signif-
icant under the reign of law, and in regard to which it is morally
imperative that the law take some definite stand. While the ap-.
plication of this proposition is often greatly exaggerated, 1 its
truth cannot be denied. The fact that something is affected by
legal sanctions adds certain moral considerations to any problem
of conduct. The possibility of being punished and of causing
consequent harm to friends and dependents, the possibility of
harming those who rely upon the law, the possibility of destroy-
ing social order, which in some degree is a necessary condition of
the good life, all these are pertinent facts in a moral judgment,
which may appear only after law is created. All this, however,
offers no ground for supposing that a rule of law which sanctions
or condemns a previously indifferent act is itself a non-moral
rule in the sense of being immune to moral appraisal. The de-
mand that I save a friend's life and the act by which this is ac-
complished do not cease to be moral if there are a number of
slightly different ways of attaining this result, among some of
which my choice is morally indifferent. So when a legislature
chooses between a rule keeping t-affic to the left and one keeping
it to the right, if it is ever the case that physiological peculiari-
ties or social habits do not make one of the contemplated rules
less dangerous than the other, the demand that the law enact
one of the two possible rules is no less a moral demand because
of the indeterminateness of the alternative. It is upon such a
moral demand that the justification of so-called non-moral law
must rest, and such a demand may easily so outweigh all the
other factors in the situation that it would be good, say, to keep
to the right, that being the law, even though the law ought to
have been made, originally, the other way.
A second claim of exemption from the domain of morality is
commonly advanced on behalf of the judicial function. The ques-
tion which a judge faces in coming to a decision, it is argued,
is purely legal, not moral. Legislatures may endeavor to decide
what the law ought to be, but it is for the judge to decide what,
in any particular case, the law is. It is apparently in this vein
that Maine, distinguishing the philosophy of law from the philos-
ophy of legislation, says, "The jurist, properly so called, has noth-
33 The argument is particularly directed to such rules as those determin-
ing the age of majoiity, the interpretation of standard phrases in deeds
and wills, etc.




ing to do with any ideal standard of law or morals." a3 And in
the same vein Dean Pound has said, "The utilitarian theory of
Bentham was a theory of legislation. The social theory of the
present is a theory of legal science." 80 So, in the general philos-
ophy of the Anglo-American bench and bar, "public policy" (the
* legal equivalent for "morality") seems to be relevant to the
decision of a case only when precedents and statutes fail and the
function of the judge becomes "legislative."
Now it is clearly true that the nature of the good does not de-
termine the decisions of judges. Such a determination, as Santa-
yana remarks, is the essence of magic. It is also true that judges
generally come to decisions without thinking about moral prin-
ciplesG7 But it is not true that the goodness or rightness of a
decision can be measured except in moral terms,
It may be the case, again, that the professional disavowal of
"moral" considerations refers only to the "conscience" theory of
morality exemplified in Professor Morgan's dichotomy between
"moral character" and "objective conduct." As such it is a valu-
able defense against the sentimental theory of justice, now in-
creasingly fashionable, 38 which abstracts from the elements of a
case everything but the interests of the two parties, and weighs
these by an intuitive application of the judge's code of "fairness."
But in its actual use, the theory we are attacking goes far be-
yond this repudiation of sentimentalism. Its actual effect is to
exclude the conscious consideration of ethical issues from the
judicial mind and to lend weight to the unconscious and uncriti-
cized value standards by which judges decide what they ought
to do. Fundamentally it attempts to set up as a standard of legal
criticism truth or consistency rather than goodness. But neither
truth nor consistency can be rivals to goodness, in legal criti-
cism or anywhere else. Truth and consistency are categories
which apply to propositions or to sets of propositions, not to
35 MAINE, EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (7th ed. 1914) 370 and lec-
tures 12 and 13 passim.
36 Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908) 8 COL. L. REV. 605, 613;
and see Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispnidence, op,
cit. supra note 8, at 140 n. 4.
37 The judge, of course, makes all sorts of moral assumptions, not only In
choosing among competing doctrines but as well in the supposedly logical
processes of generalization, classification, and construction by which re-
spectable "rules" are drawn from precedent and statute. In difficult cases
such moral assumptions frequently become explicit and may even invite
analysis. But the question to which the judge's critical faculties are regu-
larly restricted is: "What decision would an intelligent lawyer familiar
with statutes and past decisions expect in this situation?" or, more politely,
"What is the law?"
38 See Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: the Function of the "Hunch"
in Judicial Decision (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 274; FRANK, LAW AND THE MOD-
ERN MIND (1930) passim.
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actions or events. A judicial decision is a, command, not an
assertion. Even if any sense could be found in the characteriza-
tion of a decision as true or false (or, in the non-ethical sense of
the terms, right or wrong, correct or erroneous), such truth or
falsity could not determine what decision, in any case, ought to
be given. That is a question of conduct and only the categories
of ethics can apply to it. In answering such a question, the ethical
value of certainty and predictability in law may outweigh more
immediate ethical values, but this is no denial of the ethical
nature of the problem. Consistency, like truth, is relevant to such
a problem only as an indication of the interest in legal certainty,
and its value and significance are ethical rather than logical. The
question, then, of how far one ought to consider precedent and
statute in coming to a legal decision is purely ethical. The propo-
sition that courts ought always to decide "in accordance with
precedent or statute" is an ethical proposition the truth of which
can be demonstrated only by showing that in every case the fol-
lowing of precedent or statute does less harm than any possible
alternative.
The ethical responsibilities of the judge have so often been
obscured by the supposed duty to be logically consistent in the
decision of different cases that it may be pertinent to ask whether
any legal decision can ever be logically inconsistent with any
other decision. In order to find such an inconsistency we must
have two judgments, one for the plaintiff and one for the de-
fendant. But this means that we must have two cases, since a
second judgment in the same case would supersede the first judg-
ment. And between the facts of any two cases there must be
some difference, so that it will always be logically possible to
frame a single legal rule requiring both decisions, given the facts
of the two cases. Of course such a rule will seem absurd if the
difference between the two cases is unimportant (e. g., in the
names or heights of the two defendants). But whether the differ-
ence is important or unimportant is a problem not of logic but
of ethics, and one to which the opposing counsel in the later case
may propose opposite answers without becoming involved in self-
contradiction.
The confusion arises when we think of a judicial decision as
implying a rule from which, given the facts of the case, the de-
cision may be derived (the logical fallacy of affirming the con-
sequent).3 That logically startling deduction of the "law of
39 The periodic attempts of students of the common law to put forward
logical formulae for discovering "the rule of a case" all betray an elemen-
tary ignorance of the logical fact that no particular proposition can imply
a general proposition. Wambaugh, Salmond, Gray, Black, Morgan, and
Goodhart agree that the rule of a case (the ratio dccidendi, the proposition
for which a case is a precedent) is a general proposition necessary to the
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precedents" from -judicial precedents, Black's Handboolk of the
Law of Judicial Precedents, thus sums up the matter:
"Even if the opinion of the court should be concerned with un-
necessary considerations, or should state the proposition of law
imperfectly or incorrectly, yet there is a proposition necessarily
involved in the decision and without which the judgment in the
case could not have been given; and it is this proposition which
is established by the decision (so far as it goes) and for which
alone the case may be cited as an authority." 40
But elementary logic teaches us that every legal decision and
every finite set of decisions can be subsumed under an infinite
number of different general rules, just as an infinite number of
different curves may be traced through any point or finite col-
lection of points. Every decision is a choice between different
rules which logically fit all past decisions but logically dictate
conflicting results in the instant case. Logic provides the spring-
board but it does not guarantee the success of any particular
dive.
If the doctrine of stare decisis means anything, and one can
hardly maintain the contrary despite the infelicitous formula-
tions which have been given to the doctrine, the consistency
which it demands cannot be a logical consistency. The consist-
ency in question is more akin to that quality of dough which is
necessary for the fixing of a durable shape. Decisions are fluid
particular decision. See WAMBAUGH, STUDY OF CASES (2d ed. 1894) c. 2;
Salmond, Theory of Judicial Precedents (1900) 16 L. Q. REV. 376;
GRAY, op. cit. supra note 11, at § 555; BLACK, JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS (1912)
40; MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 29, at 109-10; Goodhart, Deterntining the
Ratio Decidendi of a Case (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 161. Logical objections to
this conception are dismissed by Professor Morgan as "hypercritical" and
"too refined for practical purposes." But Professor Oliphant, who refuses
to be deterred by such warnings (see his reply in Mutuality of Obliga-
tion in Bilateral Contracts at Law (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 997 n. 2 to
Professor Williston's charges of scholasticism, The Effect of One Void
Promise in a Bilateral Agreement (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 857, 869) has
suggested an alternative conception that is logically sound and practically
far more useful. Rules of increasing generality, each of them linking the
given result to the given facts, spread pyramid-wise from a decision. The
possibility of alternative modes of anaylsis makes a decision the ape.% not
of one but many such pyramids. No one of these rules has any logical
priority; courts and lawyers choose among competing propositions on extra-
logical grounds. Oliphant, A Return to Starc Decisis (1928) 6 Am LAW
SCHOOL Ray. 215, 217-18; and cf. LLEWELLYN, BRADiBLE Busn (1930) 61-66;
Bingham, What is the Law? (1912) 11 MICH. L. REV. 1, 109, 111 n. 31.
The picture clearly suggests that the decision bears to the rules the same
relation that Professor Whitehead has traced between a point and the
surfaces that would ordinarily be said to include the point. See THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE (1919) c. 8; THE CONCEPT oF NATURE
(1919) c. 4.
40 Loc. cit. supra note 39.
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until they are given "morals." It is often important to conserve
with new obeisance the morals which lawyers and laymen have
read into past decisions and in reliance upon which they have
acted. We do not deny that importance when we recognize that
with equal logical justification lawyers and laymen might have
attached other morals to the old cases had their habits of legal
classification or their general social premises been different. But
we do shift the focus of our vision from a stage where social and
professional prejudices wear the terrible armor of Pure Reason
to an arena where human hopes and expectations wrestle naked
for supremacy.
No doubt the doctrine of sture decis-is and the argument for
consistency have a significance which is not exhausted by the
social usefulness of predictable law. Even in fields where past
court decisions play a negligible role in molding expectations,
courts may be justified in looking to former rulings for guidance.
The time of judges is more limited than the boundaries of in-
justice. At some risk the results of past deliberation in a case
similar to the case at bar must be acdepted. But again we invite
fatal confusion if we think of this similarity as a logical rather
than an ethical relation. To the cold eyes of logic the difference
between the names of the parties in the two decisions bulks as
large as the difference between care and negligence. The ques-
tion before the judge is, "Granted that there are differences
between the cited precedent and the case at bar, and assuming
that the decision in the earlier case was a desirable one, is it
desirable to attach legal weight to any of the factual differences
between the instant case and the earlier case?" Obviously this
is an ethical question. Should a rich woman accused of larceny
receive the same treatment as a poor woman? Should a rich
man who has accidentally injured another come under the same
obligations as a poor man? Should a group of persons, c. g., an
unincorporated labor union, be privileged to make all statements
that an individual may lawfully make? Neither the ringing hdx-
ameters of Barbara Celarent nor the logic machine of Jevons nor
the true-false patterns of Wittgenstein will produce answers to
these questions.
What then shall we think of attempts to frame practical legal
issues as conflicts between morality, common sense, history or
sociology, and logic (logic playing regularly the Satanic role)?
One hesitates to convict the foremost jurists on the American
bench of elementary logical error. It is more likely that they
have simply used the word "logic" in peculiar ways, as to which
they may find many precedents in the current logic textbooks.4
4, See M. R. Cohen, Thw Subject Matter of Formal Logic (1918) 15 Jour.
OF PHIL. 673.
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Bertrand Russell has warned us:
"When it is said, for example, that the French are 'logical',
what is meant is that, when they accept a premise, they also ac-
cept everything that a person totally devoid of logical subtlety
would erroneously suppose to follow from that premise ...
Logic was, formerly, the art of drawing inferences; it has now
become the art of abstaining from inferences, since it has ap-
peared that the inferences we feel naturally inclined to make are
hardly ever valid." 42
If we construe the word "logic" in the light of this warning,
we may readily agree with Mr. Justice Holmes when he asserts
that "the whole outline of the law is the resultant of a conflict
at every point between logic [viz. hasty generalization] and good
sense",43 and find some meaning in the statement of Judge Car-
dozo that "the logic of one principle" prevails over the logic of
another 44 or in his pride that "We in the United States have been
readier to subordinate logic to utility." 41
42 RUSSELL, SKEPTICAL ESSAYS (1928) c. 7 (Behaviorism and Valtes) 99.
43 HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) (Agency) 49, 50.
44 CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, (1921) c. 1 (Introdaclion.
The Method of Philosophy) 41. Judge Cardozo illustrates (op. &it. 38-39)
the method of logic or philosophy, which is distinguished from the mothods
of history or evolution, of custom or tradition, and of sociology, with the
rule that one who contracts to purchase real property must pay for It
even though, before the sale is actually completed, the property is sub-
stantially destroyed. This, he maintains, is the projection to its logical
outcome of the principle that "equity treats that as done which ought to,
be done," a principle which does not apply to the sale of chattels which did
not come under the jurisdiction of Chancery. But what sort of principle
is this? It is certainly not a logical principle, i.e., a proposition certifiable
on logical grounds alone, since it is obviously false. If it were true no
plaintiff in equity could ever obtain a judgment since he could never in
the face of such a rule show that the defendant had not done what ho
ought to have done. Would it not be quite as logical for a court to say
"equity does not treat that as done which has not been done"? If a rule
is undesirable we do not make it less undesirable by deducing it from an-
other rule too vague to be liked or disliked and then concentrating our at-
tention on the process of inference rather than the premise. What is in
question in the case proposed is not a logical probldm or a choice of judicial
methods but a conflict of social interests, and there is much that may be
said in favor of throwing upon the party who contemplates future enjoy-
ment of a definite piece of real property the risk of its destruction and the
necessity of insurance. But what may thus be said bears no peculiar im-
primdtur of logic. See also CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924)
79-80.
45 GAnozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 77. This is said with re-
gard to the tendency in recent decisions (of which Judge Cardozo's opinion
in MacPherson v. Buick Mfg. Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916)
is a noteworthy landmark) to extend the scope of a manufacturer's obliga-
tions to the ultimate consumer with regard to the quality of the product.
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We may have to interpret the word "logical" as synonymous
with "aesthetically satisfying" in order to understand the state-
ment of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Warren that a distinction
between cases where "substantial mental suffering would be the
natural and probable result" of an act and cases "where no mental
suffering would ordinarily result" is not logical though very prac-
tical.4 Such an identification of the rules of logic with those of
intellectual aesthetics seems to be assumed at times by Judge
Cardozo as well.
47
No verbal definition is intrinsically objectionable. But it
seems fair to suggest that the use of the word "logic" in the
senses exemplified in these typical passages seriously lowers
the probability of clear thinking on the relation between law
and ethics. Most of us think of logic as the most general and
formal of the sciences.- Upon that basis we may say, paraphras-
ing a remark of Mr. Justice Holmes, that conformity with logic
is only a necessity and not a duty. The bad judge is no more able
to violate the laws of logic than he is to violate the laws of gravi-
tation. He may, of course, ignore both. It is not our purpose
to deny that there would be less judicial stumbling were courts
more constantly aware of the logical relations between particular
and universal, between premise and conclusion, between form
and content.
IV
The theory which denies ethical justiciability to law, in whole
or in part, cannot be maintained. Its superficial plausibility
Again the rejected "privity" analysis of the situation seems to be peculiarly
"logical" because it permits the deduction of an undesirable rule from
another undesirable rule which is too vague to arouse the resentment which
the deduced rule arouses.
See also ibid. 83, where "adherence to logical and advancement of utility"
are balanced in terms of "the social interest which each is capable of
promoting."
1 Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy (1890) 4 HARI. L.
REv. 193, reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF TORTs (1924) 122,
126.
47 "If I am seeking logical consistency, the symmetry of the legal struc-
ture, how far shall I seek it?" CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
10, and cf. ibid. 33-34.
4' "If it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be, but as it isn't,
it ain't. That's logic." CARROLL, THROUGH THE LooKING GLASS c. 4. And
see WITTGENsTEiN, TRACTATUS LOGIcO-PHILOSOPHIcUS (1922)! §§ 6.1, 6.1262;
M . R. Cohen, op. cit. supra note 41; HoernW, Review of SCIENCE OF LEGAL
METHOD (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 807; Russell, PRINCIPLES OF MATHEmkTICS,
(1903) c. 1; Adler, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposizum (1931)
31 COL. L. REV. 99-101; Keyser, On the Study of Legal Scicnce (1929)
38 YAix L. J. 413.
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arises from the narrow connotation given to the terms ethics and
morality when they are extruded from the field of legal criticism.
The falsity of the theory arises from the fact that, along with
the promptings of "conscience", the principal values of life are
banished from the juristic consciousness and an inadequate
"practical" ethics substituted. The invalidity of the inference
by which this theory is established arises from the fallacy (qua-
ternio terminoram) by which the extrusion from legal criticism
of "ethics" in its broadest sense is inferred from a denial of its
legal importance in its narrower connotation. Finally, the confu-
sion of the theory lies in the indeterminate character of the sys-
tem of values substituted by our jurists for what they call
"ethics" and "morality."
Law is just as much a part of the domain of morality as any
other phase of human custom and conduct. It has no special
purpose, end, or function, no restriction of moral scope, other
than that variable restriction which its positive and practical
nature may impose in the way of limitations of efficacy and ap-
plicability. We may, if we like, call the good which law can
achieve "justice." But if "justice" means anything less than
that total, it is not a valid basis of legal criticism. To say that
something or other is beyond the "proper scope" of law is either
to say that law on that subject will bring about more harm than
good or it is to indulge in meaningless verbiage. The evaluation
of law must be made in terms of the good life, and to demon-
strate the nature of this standard is the task of ethics, and more
particularly, of morality. Difficult as that task is and uncertain
as its conclusions have been, it is a vicious illusion to suppose
that the task of statesman or judge is less difficult, or that his
conclusions can be more certain.
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